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C.: Anti-Picketing Injunctions in State Courts As Affected By Free Sp

STUDENT NOTES
ANTI-PiCKE1]NG

INJUNCTIONS IN STATE COURTS AS AFFECTED BY

Fus

SPEECH

A recapitulation of the treatment of injunctions against picketing by the Supreme Court and our state courts reveals a change
of emphasis over the past fifteen years. In 1940, picketing was
raised on a pedestal as a sacred right of free speech. However, a
gradual transition has taken place, weakening and limiting that
view, as the courts have replaced it with a test of looking to the
objective of the picketing and allowing picketing only if the purpose was persuasive and lawful, while enjoining it if coercive1 and
unlawful. It will be the purpose of this note to collect several of
the significant Supreme Court cases which have pointed the way
for this shift in criterion, compare the few West Virginia cases in
point, and look at some of the most recent decisions of other state
courts of last resort, in an effort to see where this change has led
us in the law of picketing. While the labor relations acts of Congress have played an equally important role in labor law, this note
will be concerned only with cases which originated under state law.2
An important early case on this subject was Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union,3 which held that state authorization of peaceful
picketing did not violate the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in writing the majority opinion in the 5-4 decision, set
forth a dictum that the Court felt freedom of speech guarantees
members of a union the right to make known the facts of a labor
dispute, and further stated, ".

.

. the picketing must be peaceful;

and that term as used implies not only absence of violence, but
absence of any unlawful act."4
Those two factors, freedom of speech and lawfulness of the
picketing, have had a great influence on the courts in this field.
The first was given great emphasis by the Supreme Court for some
I On the coercive element in picketing, see Jones, Picketing and Coercion:
A Jurisprudence of Epithets; Gregory, A Defense; Jones, A Reply; Gregory,
A Conclusion, 39 VA. L. REv. 1023-1069 (1953).
2 For a discussion of picketing-free speech under the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) see Note, 35 A.L.R.2d 443 (1954).
8301 U.S. 468 (1937).
4 Id. at 479.
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time, but in later years the second has gradually displaced it until
many state courts have almost completely dropped the freedom of
speech and its clear and present danger test, in favor of a wholly-controlling test of lawfulness of purpose.
Thornhill v. Alabama was the first direct holding that picketing itself is such an element of communication that it is protected
by the first and fourteenth amendments. The case invalidated as
violative of the right of free speech a state law which prohibited
all picketing, with Mr. justice Brandeis's dictum of the Senn case
being used for authority by the 8-1 majority opinion. 6 The case gave
very little indication how the Court might react to limitations on
picketing short of complete prohibition, nor did another case decided the same day, 7 but rather the case's significance lies in the
fact that the Court was overthrowing sixty years of precedent, replacing tort law with the fourteenth amendment as the basis of
picketing law.3
In the following year the Supreme Court met the picketing
question again in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
0
The dairy sold its products both door to door through
Dairies.
union employees and to retail stores. The union picketed the dairy
because the stores were undercutting the union-delivered price. An
injunction granted by the supreme court of Illinois was affirmed
because the picketing had had some violence in its background
which the Court felt so tainted the picketing that any continued
picketing would constitute coercion. Thus we see the first limitation on the Thornhill generality: picketing blended with violence
is not constitutionally protected. Another case decided the same
day, AFL v. Swing,10 held the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of discussion was infringed by the common law of Illinois when
that state court forbade peaceful persuasion through picketing
merely because there was no immediate employer-employee dispute.
The opinion reiterated the Thornhill position, and added that
"stranger" picketing by non-employees must be protected because
of the "interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
0The dissent was by Mr. Justice McReynolds, the only remaining member
of the 4-man dissent in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.
7 Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
8 See Tanenhaus, Picketing as a Tort: The Development of the Law of

Picketing from 1880 to 1940, 14 U. PrTr. L. REv. 170 (1953).
9312 U.S. 287 (1941).
10 312 U.S. 321 (1941).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol58/iss4/6

2

C.: Anti-Picketing Injunctions in State Courts As Affected By Free Sp

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
same industry."" The Court found there had been violence involved, but the state-court decree had enjoined even peaceful picketing by strangers and the Court distinguished the Meadowmoor
holding on that basis.
2
In Blossom Dairy v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters,1
the West Virginia court was called upon to decide the propriety
of an injunction against teamsters' picketing aimed at causing the
dairy to breach a contract with an independent employee union.
The court referred to the binding effect of the Supreme Court cases,
the Thornhill and Swing decisions plus a per curiam reversal of a
New Jersey injunction,13 and concluded, ". . . accordingly, following these decisions, we must hold the plaintiff was not entitled to
an injunction on the ground that the picketing would tend to bring
about the breach of its contract with the [independent union.]"
An earlier West Virginia case to the contrary was distinguished 5 as
the court seemed to feel that peaceful picketing was such an inherent part of free speech that the purpose of the picketing was
unimportant.
The next Supreme Court case in this field of labor law, Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe,1 took another bite out
of the Thornhill case. The cafe had been picketed because the
owner was employing a nonunion contractor to erect a building
wholly unconnected with the cafe. The Court, 5-4, held the Texas
court had committed no error in enjoining such action as an illegal
restraint of trade in violation of the Texas anti-trust statute. The
Court felt that picketing a businessman to get him to exert economic
pressure upon his building contractor in an effort to unionize that
contractor's employees was outside the free-speech immunity, although the Court did not establish any rule as to how close the
relationship had to be. A beginning of the trend to downgrade the
importance of the free discussion element is indicated in the majority opinion's reference to picketing as an "industrial weapon,"
and the stress placed upon the purpose of the union activity rather
than the qualities of communication.
11 Id. at 326.
12 125 W. Va. 165, 23 S.E. 2d 645 (1942).
13 Journeyman Tailors Union v. Miller's, 312 U.S. 658 (1940).
14 125 W. Va. 165, 172, 23 S.E.2d 645, 649 (1942).
15 Parker Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union No. 813, 87 W. Va. 31,
105 S.E. 911 (1921). For an opinion that the distinction is "not convincing,"
see Mahan, Government by Injunction?, 52 W. VA. L. REv. 217, 226 (1950).
16315 U.S. 722 (1942).
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Bakery & Pastry Workers v. Wohl' 7 threw out an injunction
by the New York Court of Appeals which prohibited a union from
picketing a bakery peddler's supplier and customers because the
Court found, first, no unlawful conduct and, second, no abuse of
free speech. A concurring opinion distinguished the Ritter case
by saying these businesses were directly involved in the dispute.
Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos18 combined the Meadowmoor principle that peaceful picketing can be completely prohibited
when enmeshed with violence, and the rationale of the Wohl and
Ritter holdings that where there exists a close economic relation
between the pickets and the one picketed, no such complete ban
is proper. The cafeteria had no employees, only partner-owners,
but an injunction against picketing that establishment was held a
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The picketing was termed
peaceful, for although there had been some misrepresentation and
insults to customers, no actual violence was shown.
The Supreme Court then took a six-year respite from picketing
cases, with the preceding cases left as a guide to state courts to
the effect that no total prohibition of picketing, whether by employees or strangers, can be effective even against self-employers,
but violence equalling coercion is not protected nor is the application of economic pressure upon someone not connected with a
labor dispute. The state court decisions during that period began
to rely heavily upon the lawfulness of purpose test, rather than
stressing the Thornhill case's right of free speech. One leading case
noted that, "It is significant that in those cases where the Supreme
Court identified picketing with free speech, no unlawful purpose
of the picketing was involved,"' 9 and continued, ".

.

. a strike may

be illegal because of its purpose, however orderly the manner in
which it is conducted."20 The court concluded, " [n] either do we
believe that free speech is involved where the labor objective is
21
illegal."
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice,22 found a unanimous Supreme Court sustaining a decree which had enjoined peaceful pick17315 U.S. 769 (1942).
18320 U.S. 293 (1943).
19 Peters v. Central Labor Council, 179 Ore. 1, 10, 169 P.2d 870, 874
(1946).
20 Ibid., citing Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926).
21 Ibid.
22 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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eting carried on for the purpose of coercing ice distributors not to
sell to nonunion peddlers, when the picketing violated the antitrust
law of the state. Again the purpose was unlawful by virtue of a
statute, as in the Ritter case. The next year, in Hughes v. Superior
Court of California,23 the Court upheld an injunction which prohibited picketing of stores to enforce a demand for the hiring of
clerks on a racial basis proportional to customers. The California
court had found such a purpose to be contrary to a judicially-established state public policy against discrimination, and the Supreme
Court affirmed the injunction, finding no infringement on free speech
when the purpose of the picketing openly opposed state public
policy, even though not statutory.
Two other decisions delivered on the same day as the Hughes
case gave further impetus to the unlawful purpose doctrine. The
strongest of the day's decisions in this respect, Teamsters Union
v. Hanlce,24 affirmed a supreme court of Washington holding enjoining peaceful picketing of business places having no employees.
There had been no prior public policy in the state against such
action, judicially or legislatively announced, but the Washington
court felt the purpose objectionable, enjoined it, and the Supreme
Court affirmed it. The majority opinion seemed to wave good-bye
to the free-speech test of picketing,25 saying, ".

.

. while picketing

has an ingredient of communication, it cannot dogmatically be
equated with the constitutionally protected freedom of speech." The
third case of the day, Building Service Union v. Gazzam,20 did not
raise a new point, for the Washington court had found a priorestablished public policy prohibiting employer coercion in employee
choice of bargaining representatives so the Court only followed
the Hughes case in upholding an injunction against picketing a
hotel having 15 employees when none were union members.
After a preoccupation with picketing under the National Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act),27 and a decision that
23 339

U.S. 460 (1950).

24839 U.S. 470 (1950).
25 One commentator suggests that with Giboney v. Empire Storage &Ice,
the three cases of May 8, 1950, (the Hughes, Hanke and Gazzam cases) marked

the date of a complete retreat from the protection of the Thornhill case. Howard, The Unlawful Purpose Doctrine in Peaceful Picketing and Its Application
in the California Cases, 24 So. CALrF. L. REv. 145 (1951).
26839 U.S. 532 (1950).
27 One day brought forth four cases on picketing under federal labor laws:
NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951); NLRB v. Denver
Building & Construction Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); International Brother-
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a temporary state-court injunction was not "final" hence not reviewable by the Court,28 one further Supreme Court case dealt
with the unlawful purpose doctrine as intermingled with free
speech: Plumbers Union v. Graham,29 affirming a Virginia state
court injunction against peaceful picketing which violated the
state right-to-work statute. Since 1952, the Supreme Court has
remained silent on the question of free speech and unlawful purpose
in picketing. 30
The West Virginia court once again met the question of picketing in Ohio Valley Advertising Corp. v. Union Local 207.31 There
the court dismissed an injunction against a union which had picketed a service station where nonunion sign painters were working,
holding it ".... repugnant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Federal Constitution to deny the right of free communication
to either party engaged in an industrial dispute.. ."32 The court
quotes with approval from a Virginia case 33 to the effect that
"... picketing is subject to regulation by the State, either by legislation or by court action. But such regulation must have a reasonable basis in prevention of disorder, restraint of coercion,
protection of life or property, or promotion of the general welfare.
The instrument of State action.., must be specifically directed to
acts or conduct which overstep legal limits, and not include those
which keep within the protected area of free speech."
In light of the Supreme Court cases since the Blossom Dairy
case was before the West Virginia court, the weight of the language about "free communication" in the Ohio Valley Advertising
case would seem negligible; nevertheless it is submitted the decision
fits within the lawful purpose rules set forth by the Supreme Court.
As stated by a judge in an adjoining jurisdiction, "it may fairly
hood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Local 74, Brother-

hood of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951).

28 Montgomery Building & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter
Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178 (1952).

29345

U.S. 192 (1952).

30 One reason for the shortage of appeals from state courts may be found
in the case of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955), which held the
federal labor relations acts preclude state courts from enjoining labor unions from
picketing to compel an employer not to employ contractors having no collective

agreement with the union. State court jurisdiction was held pre-empted by the
federal acts.
31 138 W. Va. 355, 76 S.E.2d 113 (1953).
32 Id. at 367, 76 S.E.2d at 120.
3
3 Edwards v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 227, 60 S.E.2d 916 (1950).
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be said that it is difficult to rescue the principles of law decided
from the ocean of words in which they are submerged,"3 4 but the
various Supreme Court decisions seem to allow no state-court injunctive relief when the purpose of the picketing does not contravene state public policy, either legislatively or judicially announced, when there is some connection between the pickets and
the one picketed, and when there is no violence. The peaceful picketing of the Ohio Valley Advertising case violated no public policy
of West Virginia theretofore announced; the persons picketed were
in a position of close economic relation within the rule of the Wohl
and Ritter cases;35 and no violence was shown. It is therefore submitted that although the court stressed the much-weakened free
speech idea of the Thornhill case, the holding is more strongly
defensible on the newer lawful purpose doctrine.
Inasmuch as objects of peaceful picketing have not yet been
categorically enumerated as lawful and unlawful by the Supreme
Court or the West Virginia court, some cases from other state
courts of last resort which have arisen within the past year may
lend some insight to the types of purposes the courts look for. A
decision by the supreme court of Maine 36 upheld a permanent
injunction of peaceful picketing for solely organizational purposes
on the ground that it violated a state statute which guaranteed
workers freedom from interference, restraint or coercion by their
employers or other persons.3 7 The Maine court said the picketing
was aimed at coercing the employer to put pressure on non-member employees, in violation of the state public policy as set forth
in the statute, and concluded, ".... In our opinion the restraint of

such picketing does not abridge the right of free speech under the
decisions of the Supreme Court."3s
The supreme court of Ohio, after collecting the various Supreme
Court decisions, enjoined peaceful stranger picketing for the purpose of bringing pressure upon a restaurant to compel its employees
34Judge Taft in Chucales v. Royalty, 164 Ohio St. 214, 129 N.E.2d 823

(1955).
35 See 56 W. VA. L. 11Ev. 64 (1951), dealing with the Ohio Valley Ad-

vertising case on the point of picketing a secondary employer to induce him
to influence a primary employer favorably to the union.
36 Pappas v. Stacey, 151 Me. 36, 116 A.2d 497, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S.

870 (1955).
37 The case is discussed pro and con in Petro, Labor Relations Law, 31
N.Y.U.L. REv. 286, 298 (1956), and in 31 N.Y.U.L. 11v. 411 (1956).
38 Pappas v. Stacey, 151 Me. 36, 116 A.2d 497, 503 (1955).
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therein to join a union, finding industrial strife to be contrary to
state public policy.3 9 The court said, "In our opinion, picketing of
the kind involved in the instant case is and will continue to be
unlawful in Ohio until legislation making it lawful is adopted" A
recent Missouri case enjoined picketing as having an unlawful
objective when a union attempted to cause a nonprofit country
club to intervene and coerce its employees into union membership,
in violation of a constitutional provision giving employees the right
to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
40
own choosing.
The most recent pronouncement concerning picketing came
from the supreme court of Pennsylvania in a January, 1956, decision. 41 That court stated that "picketing may be enjoined if one
42
of its objects is unlawful even though not the sole object." In that
case the picketing of a restaurant was enjoined because, ". . . its
real object was to compel the employer . . . to . . . agree to the
maintenance of a closed shop and thus coerce the employer into
forcing its employees to join the union, 4 3 in violation of the state
labor relations act.
The common trend running through all these recent decisions
from the various state courts is, again, the unlawful purpose test
with little or no importance placed on free speech. Perhaps exemplary of the attitude of these state court cases44 was a statement in
an earlier Massachusetts case: 45 "The defendants rely upon certain
of the more recent cases in the Supreme Court of the United States.
... We do not understand, however, that that court has held that
picketing in support of an unlawful objective cannot be enjoined.
... Until there is an unequivocal pronouncement to that effect we
adhere to the view of the law laid down in our own decisions."
Since that 1947 remark there still has been no "unequivocal pronouncement" from any source, but as has been pointed out in the
Chucales v. Royalty, 164 Ohio St. 214, 129 N.E.2d 823 (1955).
Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, 284 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. 1955).
41 Anchorage v. Waiters and Waitresses Union, 119 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1956).
42 Id. at 201, citing the cases in note 27, supra.
43 Id. at 202.
44 An earlier state court decision along similar lines was Building Trades
Council v. Thompson, 68 Nev. 884, 234 P.2d 581 (1951), which held a union's
compelling an employer to make a contribution to a named charity as a penalty
for using an employee not in good standing with the union was an unlawful
object of picketing.
45 Colonial Press v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1947).
39
40
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cases above, the decisions of the courts have more and more tended
to retreat from the free-speech protection first announced in the
Thornhill case. Although the West Virginia court indicated in the
Blossom Dairy and Ohio Valley Advertising cases that it felt it was
strictly bound by the earlier Supreme Court holdings and, therefore, picketing had to be protected as an element of free speech, it
is submitted that if the question were to arise today the court could
feel free, if it wishes, to follow this indicated trend away from free
speech and toward unlawful purpose as the test of the propriety of
an injunction against peaceful picketing.
E. W. C.

THE

"F~mGE

AE"

oF Puimic UTmrr=TE

The United States Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois' took the
first, and a very important, step in establishing a new concept of
public utilities when, on sustaining state rate control of the grain
industry, the court recognized that it is the facts that make a business a public utility, not legislation. This decision was followed by
a series of decisions which not only firmly entrenched this concept,
but established a "fringe area" of regulated industry; an area wherein
a business "affected with a public interest ... is subject to control
for the public good".2 The day has long passed in which there remains any question of the power of the government and the courts
to regulate such industries "affected with a public interest." However, there are three questions remaining in relation to such industries: (1) the extent of the regulation in the "fringe area"; (2)
what rights the "fringe area" industries have to protection that
private industries do not have; (3) when does a private industry
enter the "fringe area?".
When radio saw the light of day in 1920 the operators submitted to regulation under the Radio Act of 19123 which had been
passed by Congress to regulate point to point wireless operators.
The introduction of radio brought forth a new problem, that of
electrical interference. Regulation of license permits was under
I2 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
Nebbia v. State of New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), wherein the court
said: "We may as well say at once that the dairy industry is not, in the accepted
sense of the phrase, a public utility." At 531. (Italics ours.)
337 STAT. 302 (1912), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-54 (1928).
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